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After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident, new regulatory re-
quirements were enforced in July 2013 and a backfit was required for all existing nuclear
power plants. It is required to take measures to prevent severe accidents and mitigate
their radiological consequences. The Regulatory Standard and Research Department,
Secretariat of Nuclear Regulation Authority (S/NRA/R) has been conducting numerical
studies and experimental studies on relevant severe accident phenomena and coun-
termeasures. This article highlights fission product (FP) release and hydrogen risk as two
major areas. Relevant activities in the S/NRA/R are briefly introduced, as follows: 1. For
FP release: Identifying the source terms and leak mechanisms is a key issue from the
viewpoint of understanding the progression of accident phenomena and planning
effective countermeasures that take into account vulnerabilities of containment under
severe accident conditions. To resolve these issues, the activities focus on wet well
venting, pool scrubbing, iodine chemistry (in-vessel and ex-vessel), containment failure
mode, and treatment of radioactive liquid effluent. 2. For hydrogen risk: because of three
incidents of hydrogen explosion in reactor buildings, a comprehensive reinforcement of
the hydrogen risk management has been a high priority topic. Therefore, the activities in
evaluation methods focus on hydrogen generation, hydrogen distribution, and hydrogen
combustion.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.p (H. Hoshi).
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On March 11, 2011, off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku, an earth-
quake struck the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
(NPS) operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).
Units 1, 2, and 3 (among six units) were scrammed shortly
after the earthquake [1]. Unit 4 was already under an outage
for a periodic inspection, and all fuels were unloaded from
the core and cooled in the spent fuel pool. Units 5 and 6
were under outage with all fuel loaded in the core and the
pressure vessel heads in place. Lines of the offsite power
were damaged because of the earthquake. All emergency
diesel generators (EDGs) were automatically started to
supply the onsite power.
After the arrival of the tsunami of historic scale, the site
was flooded and all EDGs were shut down, except for those of
Unit 6. It was later verified that offsite and onsite power sup-
plying infrastructures such as metal clad switchgears were
heavily damaged. It was judged that restoration of power
would take a long time [1]. Under this situation, a long-term
station blackout (SBO) from Units 1e5 was inevitable. A cold
shutdown state was achieved in Units 5 and 6 by utilizing
the power interchange line. There was no power
interchange between Units 1e4 and Units 5e6. The direct
current battery power of Unit 1 was lost because of the
tsunami, but the DC power of Units 2 and 3 was exhausted
within a certain period.
Loss of ultimate heat sinks and cooling systems designated
for the SBO resulted in successive severe core damage in Units
1, 2 and 3, which led to failure of the last barrier, the primary
containment vessel (PCV). A large amount of radioactive ma-
terials were released into the environment and they were
dispersed in a wide area. In particular, a significant amount of
fallout was observed in the northwest part of the Fukushima
prefecture [2].
Another diverting event was a hydrogen explosion that
significantly damaged the reactor buildings (R/Bs) in Units 1
and 3. Emergency workers were injured. Hoses and cables,
which were still undergoing work, were broken. Scattered
debris increased the space dose rate and hindered the smooth
operation of accident management. An even more unpre-
dictable event was an explosion that occurred in the R/B of
Unit 4. Later site verifications revealed a portion of hydrogen
generated in Unit 3 flew into Unit 4 via the standby gas
treatment systems (SGTSs) that shared the same stack [1].
As described previously, the experiences of the Fukushima
Daiichi NPS underline the importance of providing counter-
measures against the risks of fission products (FPs) release
and hydrogen explosion under severe accidents. Since the
Fukushima NPS accident, intensive discussions of the Japa-
nese regulation framework have continued to include the re-
quirements of severe accident countermeasures. The new
regulatory requirement was enforced in July 2013 [3]. New
regulatory requirements are backfitted to all existing nuclear
power plants (NPPs).
The regulatory requirement composed of a hierarchical
system. The system allows timely maintenance so that con-
stant improvement of safety is ensured. The Regulatory
Standard and Research Department, Secretariat of NuclearRegulation Authority (S/NRA/R) has been conducting research
and development (R&D) programs to gain a knowledge base in
important areas. This article highlights FP release and
hydrogen risk as two major areas. Relevant activities in S/
NRA/R are briefly introduced.2. FPs release to the environment in the
accident
In the Fukushima Daiichi accidents, the boundary of the PCVs
was breached after severe core damage because of high tem-
perature and high pressure in the drywell atmosphere.
Numerous estimations have been published [1,4]; however,
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation (UNSCEAR) estimated that the total amount of ra-
dionuclides released to the environment was in the range of
100e500 petabecquerels (PBq) for iodine-131 (I131) and 6e20
PBq for cesium-137 (Cs137) [5]. A study of leak paths and/or
failure mechanisms of the PCV boundary are essential to
identify vulnerabilities of the PCV under severe accident
conditions such as the durability of sealing at the top flange
and electrical cable penetrations under high temperature,
high pressure, and high humidity. To examine effective wet
well (W/W) venting strategies, it is also important to
quantify FPs released to the environment by venting through
the W/W while taking into account degradation of pool
scrubbing under severe accident conditions. Based on these
goals, descriptions focused on wet well venting, pool
scrubbing, iodine chemistry (in-vessel and ex-vessel),
containment failure mode, and treatment of radioactive
liquid effluent.
2.1. Venting
Based on TEPCO's records, hardened venting through theW/W
was attempted for Units 1, 2, and 3 [1]. This indicated that
PCVs were eventually depressurized by W/W venting in
Units 1 and 3. On the other hand, operation of W/W venting
was ready in Unit 2, but it is widely believed that W/W
venting did not work because the rupture disc was not
broken. An important lesson learned from Unit 2 is the
importance of specifying an appropriate set point of W/W
venting for securing the integrity of the PCV in a severe
accident management guide/procedure.
Under severe accident conditions, it is predicted that the
suppression pool (S/P) remains at a near-saturated condition
because the PCV pressure is generally regulated at the vapor
pressure of the S/P. If venting were conducted under such
conditions, rapid vaporization or flashing would occur. It is
likely that enhanced droplet entrainment and revolatilization
of FPs would change the scrubbing processes and degrade
decontamination in S/P. To reduce the uncertainty of the
source term, it is necessary to improve the fidelity of physical
models of pool scrubbing in the S/P. As discussed later,
separate effect tests and integral effect tests are in progress.
The rule level requires that, in the event of severe core
damage, containment failure shall be prevented by equipment
and procedures for reducing the pressure and temperature in
Fig. 1 e Facility of a large-scale pool scrubbing test.
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follows: if venting is adopted, reducing the amount of radio-
active materials contained in the exhaust gas is also required
[3]. The filtered containment venting system (FCVS) is a
practical solution, especially for boiling water reactors
(BWRs) for which the PCV is relatively small.
With regard to the hydrogen risk, it is required that the
FCVS is designed to prevent explosion of flammable gases. It is
also required to prevent detrimental effects caused by the
FCVS such as prohibiting sharing of piping with other system,
and prevent containment failure due to negative pressure.
The hydrogen risk also affected by accident management
such as the operation of the containment spray that causes
condensation of steam and increases the hydrogen concen-
tration. This aspect will be described in Section 3.
2.2. Pool scrubbing
In a BWR, a large quantity of radioactive materials released
from the fuel rods during accidents is discharged to the S/P
through safety relief valves (SRVs). Airborne aerosols in the
dry well, which are discharged from the reactor pressure
vessel (RPV) or from a molten core dropped into a PCV, flow
into the S/P through vent pipes. Therefore, pool scrubbing is
one of themost importantmechanisms for removing airborne
radioactive materials.
For this phenomenon, several mechanistic models have
been developed [6]. Interfacial steam flow caused by
evaporation is a major factor that hinder aerosols from
transferring to the aqueous phase in these models. Because
the S/P presumably remains close to the thermal saturation
state under accident conditions, depressurization caused by
venting will result in evaporation in the S/P and may
degrade the scrubbing effect. The degree of degradation
depends on a quasi-steady state and transient thermal
hydraulic conditions and chemical conditions during venting.To gain an experimental database, small-scale tests and
large-scale tests are conducted. In the small-scale tests,
separate effects will be focused by employing many parame-
ters (thermal hydraulic conditions, aerosol species, etc.) and
utilizing high-resolution instrumentations. In the large-scale
tests, integral effects will be measured, based on a scale
equivalent to actual plants.
The large-scale tests consist of a vessel 2m in diameter and
10 m in height, as Fig. 1 shows. Pool scrubbing can be
simulated in the pool region by the anticipated ranges of
thermal hydraulic conditions such as pool depth that are
expected in actual plants. Aerosols (typically, barium sulfate)
of controlled particle sizes are generated and injected into
the vessel with steam and/or air and ejected after removing
the moisture. The decontamination factor is measured by
countering passing particles at the inlet and the outlet as a
function of particle size. Natural removal mechanisms such
as entrainment, deposition, and gravitational/wet settling in
a large atmosphere region and downstream piping can cause
additional removal effects. These background components
need to be quantified to separate the pool scrubbing
component. Influences of factors such as pool depth, sparger
geometry, the composition and characteristics of aerosols,
and the combination of condensable and noncondensable
gases are quantified.
It is expected that this experimental program togetherwith
past and ongoing tests will enrich the database of pool
scrubbing and assess the efficacy of W/W venting and FCVS.
2.3. Iodine behavior for long-term cooling
Iodine is one of the most influential FPs for assessing radio-
logical consequences of severe accidents because of its high
vapor pressure and high affinity for the thyroid. As is well
known, the rate of production of volatile inorganic iodine (I2) is
very low in an alkaline solution; iodine is also dissolved as an
Fig. 2 e Synthesis of organic iodine on the primary containment vessel (PCV) wall.
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produced in an acidic solution by the reaction:
2I þ 2Hþ þ 1
2
O2#I2 þH2O (1)
In a PCV, inorganic iodine is distributed in the gaseous and
aqueous phases in a quasi-equilibrium state. As mentioned
previously, iodine is entrained into the environment under
depressurization by venting. Furthermore, if the quasi-equi-
librium state is broken and inorganic iodine concentration in
the gaseous phase decreases, iodine molecules can be pro-
duced by the reaction in Equation (1).
Ishikawa et al. estimated the environmental release of
iodine from Unit 3 using the Kinetics of Iodine Chemistry Ki-
netics of Chemical Evolution (KICHE) code [8], which is a
mechanistic iodine chemistry model derived from the library
of iodine reactions in containment (LIRIC) code [9]. A report
indicated that a significant amount of inorganic gaseous
iodine (I2) is released into the environment from the S/P via
W/W venting [10].
Based on studies of organic iodine behaviors in the inter-
national collaboration program of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency
(OECD/NEA) Behaviour of Iodine Project (BIP) [11], it is deduced
that more organic iodine is synthesized under highly
irradiative conditions [8]. If a macropore on the paint surface
of PCV wall is filled with water, radicals (e.g. H,, OH,) are
generated in this pore, as Fig. 2 illustrates. Thus, macropores
are regarded as generation sites in organic iodine processes
under irradiative conditions. If organic iodine is produced in
the PCV, it is very difficult to remove or to be retained in the
PCV by natural removal mechanisms.
If an isotopic ratio of iodine in contamination (e.g. I129/Cs137)
can be quantified in the PCV, R/B, the environment, etc., it is
useful to identify potential leak paths and forms of iodine (e.g.
aerosol, gas). Short-lived radionuclides (e.g. I131, 8.04 days)
have already decayed, although long-lived radionuclides are
still detectable. It is notable that onsite dose measurements
during decommissioning has significant values in developing
models for FPs behaviors under severe accidents.Even if accident management was properly implemented
and PCV integrity was maintained, long-term quantitative
estimation of iodine remains important, as will be discussed
later. The iodine chemistry model was developed to estimate
iodine behaviors, especially for the late phase of an accident.
In principle, this model deals with the late phase of severe
accidents. It is assumed that energetic phenomena have been
suppressed or ceased by adoption of accident management
countermeasures and (quasi-) equilibrium states have been
achieved in the PCV. A thermodynamic approach rather than
a reaction rate approach was applied to estimate the equilib-
rium states.2.4. FP release with molten coreeconcrete interaction
As summarized in reference [12], FPs are released into the PCV
in association with the molten coreeconcrete interaction
(MCCI). Most volatile radionuclides are released from the
fuel during core degradation in the RPV, whereas nonvolatile
nuclides are released into the atmosphere as a consequence
of the MCCI [13]. Major exothermal reactions are involved in
concrete ablation and rebar oxidization during the MCCI. A
significant portion of the generated aerosols comes from
concrete and primarily consists of basic materials. They are
released into the PCV. Changes in filtering or pool scrubbing
for aerosols originating from the MCCI remain unclear. If
these alkaline materials are dissolved in the S/P via
scrubbing, then the pH of the S/P increases and generation
of inorganic iodine (I2) is suppressed. However, if the S/P is
too basic, organic material (e.g. paint) is dissolved into the S/
P. This may enhance the generation of organic iodine.2.5. Failure modes of the containment boundary
After the core damage in the Fukushima Daiichi accidents, the
pressure and temperature in the PCV rose to quite high values
before steadywater injectionwas established.When theweak
parts of the boundary of PCV were breached, FPs, steam,
hydrogen, etc. leaked through these leak paths into the R/B.
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exceeded the design pressure limit, based on the surviving
instrumentation signals. Instrumentation of the PCV tem-
perature was unfortunately unavailable. Based on simulation
results, it is very likely that the temperature of the PCV at-
mosphere exceeded far beyond the design temperature limit
[14]. It is necessary to take into account localized temperature
increases induced by heat sources such as high temperature
steam flows ejected from the RPV, lumps of molten corium
dropped into the cavity, and natural convection flows since
radionuclides were detected in R/B, FPs, and steam.
A significant amount of fallout was observed in the
northwest part of the Fukushima prefecture. Some simulation
results suggested that radionuclides released from Unit 2 are
the primary contributors [15]. The report of Katata et al. [16]
recently suggested that dose peaks detected at Tokai-mura
can be correlated with pressure peaks of the RPV observed
in Unit 2 (denoted as “1”, “2”, and “3” in Fig. 3).
The influences of SRV operation also need to be considered;
however, a closer observation of Fig. 3 indicates that the PCV
pressure increased stepwise when RPV pressure peaks
appeared. Intensive releases of radionuclides accompanying
these pressure peaks indicate that the core has already been
damaged. If PCV pressure data is reliable, it is reasonable to
deduce that the boundary was breached gradually because
of these pressure peaks and it was significantly breached in
approximately 89 hours.
Each pressure peak may correspond to some drastic phe-
nomena. For example, the molten core slumped down into the
bottom head and a significant amount of gaseous materials
were released intoPCV.Asafirstapproximation, it isplausible to
assume that leakpaths in the PCVwere enlargeduntil a balance
between inflow and outflow of steam and hydrogen was estab-
lished inside the PCV. Based on this assumption, a rough esti-
mation of the release history of radionuclides is possible, based
on the quasi-static thermal hydraulic calculation that can
reproducemeasuredPCVpressurehistories, asdescribedbelow:
SNGC þ SH2O/LPCV (2)
in which “S” denotes the source rate (kg/s) in the PCV; the
subscripts “NCG” and “H2O” indicate noncondensable gases
andwater/vapor, respectively; “LPCV” denotes the leak rate (kg/
s) from the PCV through the PCV top head flange and/orFig. 3 e The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure and
primary containment vessel (PCV) pressure of Unit 2 [17].penetrations; and “SNCG” is the summation of hydrogen and
carbon monoxide generated in the core and in the cavity by
the MCCI, as described below:
SNCG ¼ SH2 ;Core þ SH2 ;MCCI þ SCO;MCCI (3)
Along with the aforementioned reverse analyses from the
source term, it is also important that a forward approach fo-
cuses on causality for potential PCV failure modes. In general,
lumped parameter codes are applied for simulating accident
progression. These codes do not provide sufficiently high-
resolution data to deduce potential causes. Commercial
computational fluid dynamic codes are accordingly applied,
as shown in Fig. 4. The three-dimensional geometry formed by
PCV internals was modeled by considering factors such as the
RPV, piping, pumps, biological shield. In this example, a
leakage at the SRV gaskets was assumed and the velocity
and temperature field were visualized. In this example, a
localized high temperature zone can be observed near
electrical cable penetrations.2.6. Treatment of radioactive liquid effluent
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety stan-
dard, Severe Accident Management Programs for Nuclear Power
Plants for Protecting People and the Environment, NS-G-2.15, 2009,
states the following:
“Accident management is the taking of a set of actions
during the evolution of a beyond design basis accident:
(a) To prevent the escalation of the event into a severe
accident;
(b) To mitigate the consequences of a severe accident;
(c) To achieve a long-term safe stable state.” [18]
In the Fukushima Daiichi accidents, tsunami, and
flooding caused the inflow of plain water and seawater via
failures of the reactor vessel and the containment vesselFig. 4 e The CFD approach to estimate the primary
containment vessel (PCV) boundary integrity. The images
show (A) the flow velocity and (B) the temperature
distribution.
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radioactive effluent in the reactor building and the turbine
building. The amount of effluent increased because of
intended water injection. If cracks are initiated in buildings,
trenches, and the ground, then rain and groundwater may
flow into buildings. As long as the effluent increases, stag-
nant liquid radioactive effluent shall be treated. Japanese
industries have established a large-scale recirculation sys-
tem that consists of a multistep removal of radioactive
materials (e.g., FPs, transuranic elements, corrosion prod-
ucts), desalting (e.g., reverse osmosis membrane, evapora-
tive concentration), waste sludge, and cesium adsorption
tower [19]. These technologies have a wide range of
applicability in accident management.3. Hydrogen risk
As described in the Introduction section, hydrogen explosions
occurred in Units 1, 3, and 4 and heavily destroyed the reactor
buildings. A large amount of hydrogen was generated in the
RPV and PCV by a zirconiumewater reaction during core
degradation and MCCI. Oxidation of boron carbide (B4C) and
steel are also important sources in BWRs. Hydrogen generated
in PCVmigrated into the R/B. Leakage paths to R/B are yet to be
clarified. However, possible causes are degradation of the
silicone rubber sealing used at the top flanges, hatches, and
electrical cable penetrations under high temperature. For Unit
4, TEPCO and the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) both
conducted detailed site verifications by confirming the con-
dition of the SGTSs in Units 3 and 4 (e.g., valve positions, local
radiation levels of filters), the leakage paths fromUnit 3 to Unit
4, and the condition of the spent fuel pool in Unit 4. It is
commonly understood that a portion of hydrogen that was
generated in Unit 3 traveled into Unit 4 via lines of SGTSs of
two units that shared the same stack [1].
Based on these lessons, the new regulatory requirement re-
quires preparation of equipment and procedures against
hydrogen explosions in the PCV and in the R/B. For the PCV,
currently prospected measures are inertizing the atmosphere
for BWRs and hydrogen concentration control [e.g., passive
autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) and igniters] for PWRs. For R/B
(annular for PWRs), either hydrogen concentration control or
hydrogen discharge is prospected. These measures shall also
prevent explosion due to the late generation of hydrogen and
oxygen produced through radiolysis. Installing hydrogen
monitoring systems that are reliable under severe accidents is
required. Relevant equipment shall be connected to alternative
power sources if necessary. For discharge, prevention of explo-
sion and reduction of radioactivematerials shall be ensured [2].
Because of three incidents of hydrogen explosions in the
reactor buildings, a comprehensive reinforcementof hydrogen
risk management has been a high priority topic. In this paper,
activities in evaluation methods have focused on hydrogen
generation, hydrogen distribution, and hydrogen combustion.
3.1. Hydrogen generation
The oxidation reactions of zirconium, steel, and B4C are
important. Hydrogen generation depends on relevant in-vessel and ex-vessel processes such as fuel failure, relocation,
debris bed cooling, and MCCI implemented in the system
codes such as melting core (MELCOR) and Modular Accident
Analysis Program (MAAP). There are large scatterings in
modeling and prediction by major system codes [20].
In-vessel processes are generally categorized into the early
phase in which fuel geometry is fairly intact and the late
phase in which geometry is totally collapsed because of
melting, the formation of the molten pool, and the relocation
of the molten core into the bottom head. In the early phase,
uncertainties exist in oxide layer failure; oxidation of the
mixture of fuel, metal, and B4C; quenching; and reflooding. In
the late phase, cladding failure and loss of core geometry
cause substantial uncertainties. The geometry of particulate
debris is also important.
Ex-vessel processes involve radiolysis, corrosion,
fuelecoolant interaction, MCCI, among others. In the long-
term, these processes become continuous hydrogen sources.
Fuelecoolant interaction involves melt jet breakup, fragmen-
tation, and agglomeration, and produces substantial un-
certainties for in-vessel processes and for ex-vessel processes,
particularly when cavity injection is adopted.
The amount of hydrogen generated in the RPV and PCV
depends on the accident scenario. Level 1 and Level 2 Proba-
bilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) are practical approaches to
extract a set of candidate scenarios that correspond to
containment failure by hydrogen explosion. The chosen sce-
narios need to be justified from various aspects. If a single
scenario is insufficient, additional conservatism can be sup-
plemented or another scenario can be considered.
In a fast sequence initiated by a large break loss of coolant
accident accompanied by emergency core-cooling system
failure, hydrogen is generated shortly after the accident. From
the viewpoint of response time of countermeasures (e.g., PARs
and igniters), the scenario ensures a conservative basis. On
the other hand, based on short-term hydrogen generation,
late scenarios such as a small break loss of coolant accident
(SBLOCA) and SBO can produce a larger amount of hydrogen
resulting from delayed RPV failure [20].
The guide requires the assumption that the amount of
hydrogen generated before RPV failure corresponds to the
complete reaction of 75% of the zirconium loaded in the core.
This value is nearly equivalent to 100% of cladding belonging
to the active core region in 12 ft 17  17 PWR fuels. This
requirement includes uncertainties of in-vessel scenarios. Ex-
vessel processes require the assumption that hydrogen is
generated through radiolysis. They also require the assump-
tion that combustible gases and noncondensable gases are
generated through the MCCI [3].
3.2. Hydrogen distribution
The guide requires that hydrogen distribution needs to be
taken into account by computer codes that were validated by
test data. Stratification and localization of hydrogen are two
major uncertainties in actual plants. Safety systems such as
the natural recirculation system and PARs induce several
influential factors, geometry of PCV internals, location and/or
elevation of ejection points, mixing and steam condensation
caused by CV spray, and convection.
Fig. 5 e The Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC) tests and time-dependent helium concentration of test (M-4-3)
simulated by a lumped parameter model. The images show (A) the NUPEC test containment [21], and (B) the history of the
helium concentrations in the dome [24].
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containment, Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC)
[21] andHeiss-Dampf Reaktor (HDR) [22] are frequently referred
to becausebothare adoptedas International StandardProblems
(ISPs) for validating integral codes, lumpedparameter codesand
CFD codes. It is generally observed that ejection from a lower
elevation (e.g., RPV and coolant piping) results in a good
mixing, whereas ejection from an upper elevation (e.g.,pressurizer relief valves) may enhance stratification in the
dome [23]. It is also widely accepted that CV spray would have
positive effects (i.e., mixing) and negative effects (i.e., steam
condensation) on hydrogen distribution. Fig. 5 shows the
results of the NUPEC test M-4-3 in which ejection from the
lower part of steam generators (SGs) was simulated and the
CV spray was switched off. Nearly uniform distribution was
established in the long run [24].
Fig. 6 e Example of helium stratification collapsed by
vertical jet flow in a PANDA facility simulated by fine mesh
CFD model (FLUENT) [29]. The images show (A) the fine
mesh CFD model of PANDA vessels and (B) the simulated
helium concentration and flow line.
Fig. 7 e Example of a coarse mesh CFD model. The images
show (A) the GOTHIC model for the pressurized water
reactoreprimary containment vessel (PWRePCV) and (B)
the PWRePCV CAE model.
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distribution. This code uses a combined model of lumped
parameter and distributed parameter volumes. A turbulence
model can be implemented in the latter approach. In the
present application, the lower region of the PCV was parti-
tioned by major internals such as the RPV and SGs. The
resultant volumes are generally regarded as open compart-
ments. This region is modeled by a small number of lamped
parameter volumes and neighboring sections connected with
junctions. The upper dome region, where hydrogen can
accumulate, was divided into relatively coarse distributed
parameter volumes. In this article, this approach is called the
“lamped parameter model” and is reasonable if there is no
significant stagnant spot in the lower region and if stratifica-
tion in the dome region is not conspicuous, as it is in Fig. 5. The
GOTHIC code and this modeling approach were validated by
the NUPEC test series [25].
Advancement of flow field visualization techniques such
as particle image velocimetry (PIV) facilitates the obtaining of
high-resolution multidimensional data. Through participa-
tion in OECD/NEA projects, SESAR Thermal-Hydraulics (SETH)[26], SETH2 [27], and Hydrogen Mitigation Experiments for
Reactor Safety (HYMERES) [28], knowledge has been gained
regarding underlying mechanisms involved in thermal
stratification, erosion by jet flows, and the separate and
combined effects caused by coolers and sprays. As Fig. 6
shows, the fine mesh CFD model with turbulence models
were applied. More than millions of meshes are normally
employed to capture detailed flow structures [29].
3.2.1. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD); FLUENT;
PANDA
Based on current computer resources in ordinary design sites,
it still seems impractical to apply fine mesh CFD models to
actual plant analyses with complex internal geometry. To
bridge the lumped parameter model and the fine mesh CFD
mode, the coarse mesh CFD model is constructed by GOTHIC.
An example for PWR-PCV is shown in Fig. 7. The containment
vessel is represented by hundreds of thousands of CFD
meshes in the orthogonal coordination. Three-dimensional
geometry formed by major internals is modeled much more
faithfully in comparison with the lumped parameter model
with considering permeability and porosity. Furthermore,
this approach makes good use of proven lumped parameter
models of GOTHIC, such as coolers, sprays, PARs and
igniters, with including detailed three-dimensional flow
mechanisms if necessary. The coarse mesh model provides
higher resolution in predicting stagnant spots and
stratification. If meshes are allocated appropriately, it is
expected that this model can be applied to provide a basis of
quantitative explanation for positioning PARs and igniters.3.3. Hydrogen combustion
Evaluating the efficacy of preventive measures against PCV
failure is required in the rule level. In a hydrogen explosion,
this rule is further interpreted as the prevention of detonation
that may cause PCV failure. The criterion is to avoid a deto-
nable zone that limits the hydrogen concentration to 13% or
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validated by a past experimental database of hydrogen com-
bustion, as discussed later.
A transition to detonation can be observed at low con-
centrations such as 12.5% in relatively simple tube-like test
facilities [30]. In a large-scale hydrogen combustion test series
conducted by NUPEC, combustion and flame acceleration in
multicompartments were observed under various
conditions. This test represented the internal geometry of a
non-inertized dry type PCV of PWRs. Each compartment has
relatively large apertures. Flame propagation is
multidimensional in nature. Split flames interact with each
other and suppress continuous acceleration. This indicates
that detonation would not occur when the dry concentration
is lower than 15% [31]. In a wet atmosphere, a portion of
generated heat is consumed for heating steam and a
fraction of the combustion is decreased, which increases the
minimum concentration for detonation. For the inertized
type of PCV of BWRs, the criteria for avoiding the
flammability zone is either a hydrogen concentration of <4%
or an oxygen concentration of <5%.
Mixing in actual PCVs is expected to be sufficient, although
some degree of localization is unavoidable. This can be eval-
uated by validated computer codes. As far as compartment
scale combustion is concerned, the resultant pressure loads
can be conservatively estimated, based on surrogate models
such as the Shapiro diagram and the adiabatic isochoric
complete combustion (AICC) model. A transition from slow to
fast deflagration can also be conservatively estimated by the
sigma criterion.
Including NUPEC combustion tests, several large-scale
combustion tests have been conducted in the past [30e33].
Through these tests, experimental knowledge had been
gained concerning combustion behaviors in an open space,
flame propagation through multiple compartments, and
geometrical effects in a closed space (obstacles, pathways,
location of ignition, etc.). Phenomena intrinsic to multi-
compartments such as the jet ignition were also observed in
some tests. Based on these data, lumped parameter models
and CFD models were both validated. If local combustion,
flame acceleration, and deflagration to detonation transition
(DDT) are a serious concern, more sophisticated and chal-
lenging approaches will be necessary.
In physical modeling, it is believed that burnt gas expan-
sion and turbulence eddy will accelerate a subsonic slow
flame. Because of flow instability and interactions with ob-
stacles, the flamemay accelerate to the supersonic velocity. A
combustion rate near the shockwave front will be enhanced
by turbulence-inducing diffusion. This then accelerates the
flame front until quench occurs [34].
Numerical analyses of flame acceleration and DDT de-
mand comprehensive capturing of turbulence and combus-
tion. According to the report summarized by the OECD/NEA
expert group [35], unsteady complex phenomena such as
turbulence flow, distribution of chemical species,
combustion reactions, compressible flow and shockwave
need to be implemented as numerical models. Recent
deflagration tests such as OECD/NEAeThermal Hydraulic,
Hydrogen, Aerosol and Iodine (THAI) at Becker Technology
[36] and ENACCEF at ICARE [37] provide high-resolution dataof flame acceleration as functions of various parameters.
Based on these experimental data, improvement of
computational tools is expected.4. Conclusion
From lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, a
newregulatory requirementwas enforced and requiredbackfit
to all existing NPPs. The S/NRA/R has been conducting R&D
programs to gain a knowledge base in important areas. In this
article, FP release and hydrogen risk were highlighted as two
major areas. Relevant activities in S/NRA/R were also briefly
described. To realize continuous enhancement of safety,
persistentmaintenance of the regulatory system is necessary,
based on R&D, analyses of past accidents, follow-up of inter-
national standards (such as those of the IAEA), and forming
partnerships with other regulatory organizations and cooper-
ation with experts. The S/NRA/R maintains a positive attitude
in sharing knowledge with the international community.Conflicts of interest
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